Entries by 'David Keaton'

Performance of Compiler-Assisted Memory Safety Checking

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By David Keaton
Senior Researcher
CERT Secure Coding Initiative

David KeatonAccording to a 2013 report examining 25 years of vulnerabilities (from 1998 to 2012), buffer overflow causes 14 percent of software security vulnerabilities and 35 percent of critical vulnerabilities, making it the leading cause of software security vulnerabilities overall. As of July 2014, the TIOBE index indicates that the C programming language, which is the language most commonly associated with buffer overflows, is the most popular language with 17.1 percent of the market. Embedded systems, network stacks, networked applications, and high-performance computing rely heavily upon C. Embedded systems can be especially vulnerable to buffer overflows because many of them lack hardware memory management units. This blog post describes my research on the Secure Coding Initiative in the CERT Division of the Carnegie Mellon University Software Engineering Institute to create automated buffer overflow prevention.

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Helping Developers Address Security with the CERT C Secure Coding Standard

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By David Keaton,
Senior Member of the Technical Staff
CERT Secure Coding Team

David Keaton By analyzing vulnerability reports for the C, C++, Perl, and Java programming languages, the CERT Secure Coding Team observed that a relatively small number of programming errors leads to most vulnerabilities. Our research focuses on identifying insecure coding practices and developing secure alternatives that software programmers can use to reduce or eliminate vulnerabilities before software is deployed. In a previous post, I described our work to identify vulnerabilities that informed the revision of the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) standard for the C programming language. The CERT Secure Coding Team has also been working on the CERT C Secure Coding Standard, which contains a set of rules and guidelines to help developers code securely. This posting describes our latest set of rules and recommendations, which aims to help developers avoid undefined and/or unexpected behavior in deployed code. 

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Improving Security in the Latest C Programming Language Standard

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By David Keaton,
Researcher
The CERT Secure Coding Program

David KeatonBuffer overflows—an all too common problem that occurs when a program tries to store more data in a buffer, or temporary storage area, than it was intended to hold—can cause security vulnerabilities. In fact, buffer overflows led to the creation of the CERT program, starting with the infamous 1988 “Morris Wormincident in which a buffer overflow allowed a worm entry into a large number of UNIX systems. For the past several years, the CERT Secure Coding team has contributed to a major revision of the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) standard for the C programming language. Our efforts have focused on introducing much-needed enhancements to C and its standard library to address security issues, such as buffer overflows. These security enhancements include (conditional) support for bounds-checking interfaces, (conditional) support for analyzability, static assertions, “no-return” functions, support for opening files for exclusive access, and the removal of the insecure gets() function. This blog posting explores two of the changes—bounds-checking interfaces and analyzability—from the December 2011 revision of the C programming language standard, which is known informally as C11 (each revision of the standard cancels and replaces the previous one, so there is only one C standard at a time).

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